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SOMETHING TO (LEX LOCI) CELEBRATIONIS?
MEG PENROSE *

O

N June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued two
opinions relating to same-sex marriage. 1 In neither case did the Court
issue the revolutionary decision granting a federal constitutional right to
marriage. 2 But, in the only case where the Court reached the merits of the
same-sex marriage controversy, United States v. Windsor, 3 an argument can be
made that the Court planted the seeds for enshrining a future constitutional right
to marriage based either on equal protection or substantive due process
grounds. 4 Actually, the better argument might be that Windsor is the
germinated outgrowth of the Court’s previous jurisprudence relating to gay
rights. 5 Under Justice Scalia’s prediction—and, to be fair, he has accurately
and presciently forecasted the trajectory of this issue 6—full-fledged gay
marriage is but a constitutional season or two away. 7

* Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. Professor Penrose teaches
courses in Constitutional Law, Federal Criminal Procedure, Federal Civil Procedure, Gender
Discrimination, and First Amendment. Professor Penrose would like to thank her colleagues
who improved this essay during a faculty speaker presentation at Texas A&M University
School of Law in August, 2013. Professor Penrose also recognizes the courageous same-sex
couples whose legal marriages have brought this issue to the forefront.
1. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2. The Court returned Perry to the lower court, essentially reinstating the federal
district court’s opinion, based on the majority’s finding that the Court lacked standing. It is
noteworthy that both gay marriage cases provided lengthy discussions relating to standing and
justiciability. Avoiding the merits of such controversial and heated issues is not, however,
foreign to the Court. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974)
(dismissing an educational affirmative action case on mootness grounds).
3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
4. See id. at 2694 (noting that unions treated as second-class marriages for purposes of
federal law raise “a most serious question under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment”).
Shortly thereafter, the Court notes that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States
Code” and has the principal effect to “identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and
make them unequal.” Id.
5. The progression toward legalizing marriage, at the Supreme Court level, had
previously begun first with overturning the criminality of intimate acts between consenting
individuals. See generally McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (overturning laws that
prohibited intimate relations between interracial couples). Then, once the underlying intimate
act is found constitutionally protected, the larger relationship (marriage) is given
constitutional protection. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down
anti-miscegenation laws as unconstitutional).
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia predicted that Lawrence’s “reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 601. Justice Scalia returned to the gay marriage
issue a few pages later when he admonished, “[a]t the end of its opinion—after having laid
waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says that the present case
‘does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter.’ Do not believe it.” Id. at 604.
7. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that the second
“state-law shoe” finding all same-sex marriage prohibitions unconstitutional will be “dropped
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Windsor holds Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, commonly
referred to as DOMA, unconstitutional. DOMA provided a federal definition of
marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife . . . .” 8 After a long section regarding the prudential reasons to resolve the
case, Justice Kennedy’s majority finds “that DOMA is unconstitutional as a
deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.” 9 The majority conflates, however, the liberty component of the
Fifth Amendment (which sounds of substantive due process) with the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment by vacillating between liberty
(substantive due process) and equality verbiage. 10 The Court does not clearly
use a heightened standard of constitutional review, such as intermediate
scrutiny, which is usually applied to gender cases 11 or strict scrutiny, which is
reserved for suspect classes such as race or national origin. 12 In fact, it is
difficult to discern precisely what level of review the majority applies when it
finds DOMA “invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” 13
This language sounds of “rational basis,” the lowest form of constitutional
review and least searching level of constitutional scrutiny. 14 Most laws
evaluated under rational basis are easily found constitutional because all that is
required is a legitimate governmental purpose. 15 In fact, under traditional
rational basis review, courts will generally provide aid and deference to the
governmental entity seeking to uphold a particular law. 16 If the governmental
actor is unable to provide a rational basis for the legislative classification, courts
using true rational basis review will conjure up hypothetical reasons that might
suffice to uphold the law. 17 The majority gives no such encouragement in
Windsor.
The other form of “rational basis” review, and the form that has been
seemingly applied by the Supreme Court in the two gay rights cases is

later, maybe next Term”).
8. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
9. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
10. See id. The Court proclaims both that Windsor’s liberty and equality has been
violated in three consecutive paragraphs. One wonders whether such presentation is
intentionally confusing or merely careless. Constitutionally speaking, the presentation is
undoubtedly lacking in precision.
11. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (seminal sex discrimination case
establishing an intermediate, or “mid-tier,” level of constitutional scrutiny).
12. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–27 (1995). “[W]e hold
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Id. at 227. “In other
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests.” Id.
13. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
14. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
15. See id. at 488 (“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
16. See id. at 487.
17. See id.
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something scholars call “rational basis plus” review. This standard of review
tolerates legislative classifications, unless the classification is based on animus
or a desire to cause harm to an unpopular group. 18 Perhaps Justice Kennedy is
simply expanding his past writings in Romer v. Evans 19 and Lawrence v.
Texas 20 where the focus was on animus toward same-sex couples rather than
clear application of a traditional standard of constitutional review. 21
Throughout Windsor’s majority opinion, the Court speaks of “[t]he avowed
purpose and practical effect of [DOMA which] are to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the [individual] States.” 22
Other rhetoric in the majority opinion condemns the “interference with the
equal dignity of same-sex marriages” 23 and the principle purpose of DOMA “to
impose inequality” 24 without valid reason. Such phrasings indicate the
majority’s disapproval of the federal government’s attempt to provide tiered
approaches toward marriage, one for “traditional” opposite-sex marriage and
one for same-sex marriage. 25 So, does Windsor follow past precedence in
giving special “rational basis plus” evaluation to same-sex issues or is the Court
simply being obtuse? Reading the majority opinion does not provide an answer.
Perhaps Windsor is simply another step in the long march toward marriage
equality. What began in Romer was most assuredly expanded in Lawrence and
set the stage for Windsor and beyond. If Justice O’Connor’s legacy is as the
Supreme Court’s “swing vote,” Justice Kennedy’s is quickly becoming that of
the “gay rights” Justice. In all three cases where the Court has extended
protections to members of the gay community, Justice Kennedy has written the
majority opinion. 26 In each case, however, Justice Kennedy has advanced the
right as narrowly as possible, always indicating that the Court is not yet ready to
constitutionalize a federal right to same-sex marriage 27 as previously occurred

18. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
19. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
20. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Romer
indicates that the Colorado Amendment struck down was constitutionally deficient for at least
two reasons:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall
explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.
Id.
22. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 2694.
25. See id. at 2693–94.
26. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
27. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In distinguishing Lawrence from Bowers v.
Hardwick, the case directly overruled by Lawrence, Justice Kennedy clearly indicates what
the case is not about:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might
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for interracial couples in Loving v. Virginia. 28 Justice Scalia and other
observers have been quick to criticize Justice Kennedy for his lack of clarity, if
not fidelity, to constitutional review and applications of constitutional levels of
scrutiny in each of these three cases. 29
Rather than enter the debate as to Justice Kennedy’s draftsmanship in the
gay rights opinions, I would like to simply observe that Windsor leaves a
pivotal question unanswered. This question merits immediate attention and will
undoubtedly serve as the next vehicle for advancing same-sex marriage. While
Windsor clearly extends federal marital benefits (and burdens) 30 to persons
whose marriage is lawful both within the lex loci celebrationis 31 and the lex
loci domicilii, 32 Windsor actively sidesteps the follow-up and equally important
question of whether federal marital benefits (and burdens) extend to all persons
married, but not domiciled, in a state where same-sex marriage is lawfully
recognized.
The next “big” question regarding same-sex marriage will be whether
marriages that are performed in a state permitting same-sex marriage but where
the spouses then return, or move, to a state that does not permit, much less
sanction, same-sex marriage, qualify for federal marriage benefits. This
scenario can occur in one of two ways: first, you can have a couple that travels
to a location for a “destination wedding” to intentionally avoid their home
state’s marriage laws, 33 or, second, you can have a couple that was originally
domiciled and married in a state permitting same-sex marriage, only later to

be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not
be easily refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Id. Justice Kennedy’s cautious approach was echoed in Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion. See id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
28. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing “rootless and
shifting” nature of majority’s justifications for its holding in Windsor). “The sum of all the
Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection
grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous
federalism component playing a role.” Id. at 2707. The majority opinion notes the criminal
law protections, bankruptcy, taxes, health care, and ethics issues that lawfully married samesex couples are denied under DOMA. See id. at 2695 (majority opinion).
30. See id. at 2695. (“DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and
responsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be
honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”).
ONLINE,
31.
Lex
loci
celebrationis
definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lex%20loci%20celebrationis (last visited Sept. 8,
2013) (“[T]he law of the place where a contract, esp. of marriage is made.”). Literally
meaning the law of the place of the ceremony. See id. The Oxford Reference defines this
phrase as “[t]he law of the place of celebration of marriage.” Lex loci celebrationis definition,
REFERENCE,
OXFORD
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100103412 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2013).
32. Literally, the place of domicile.
33. An example under this scenario would be a Texas couple flying to New York,
waiting the requisite twenty-four hour period under New York law, and then obtaining a
lawful marriage under New York state law.
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move to another state where such marriages are not recognized. 34 These two
scenarios are factually distinguishable and may—but should not—result in
distinct legal holdings.
The reason that these scenarios are legally
indistinguishable is that the benefits at stake are based on federal, rather than
state, citizenship. Read fairly, Windsor extends federal benefits to legally
married same-sex couples.
Reviewing courts should adopt the lex loci celebrationis approach to
awarding federal marriage benefits for all purposes. In fact, the federal
government already adopts the lex loci celebrationis approach for other
marriages that were legal where conducted, such as common law marriages or
varying age and consanguinity restrictions. 35 Further, early interpretive
pronouncements from varying federal agencies such as the Department of
Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Internal Revenue
Service are all unequivocally adopting the lex loci celebrationis approach for
determining which marriages qualify for federal benefits. If the marriage was
legal where celebrated, same-sex couples will receive federal benefits. Well, at
least from these federal agencies. Further, though these federal agency
articulations are critical, they appear as secure—or fleeting—as the next
presidential administration.
Nothing prevents a change in policy or
interpretation. The marriage recognition issue should ultimately be determined
by an Article III Court rather than through agency interpretations. The marriage
recognition issue is not one of policy but, rather, one of constitutional
magnitude.
While scholars and legislators may strive to differentiate between Windsor
in its pure state—only permitting the federal government to recognize same-sex
marriages where the marriage is both conducted in a state, or country, that
permits same-sex marriage and the couple continues to reside in a state that
recognizes same-sex marriage—and the more generic question of which
marriages should be federally recognized, the factual distinctions should not
impact the legal outcome.
It is notable that the marriage in Windsor was performed in Canada, a
country that permits same-sex marriage, and the couple resided in New York, a
state that recognizes same-sex marriage. In the most literal sense, Windsor
involved a destination wedding for the couple who, when they were initially
wedded, were required to leave the country to find acceptance for their union.
Only because New York, their home state, later acceded to their view of samesex marriage does Windsor become an easy case—legal at the time of marriage
and legal in the place of domicile.
Windsor’s tone, though not its intentionally cautious language, suggests

34. An example under this scenario would be a New York couple marrying in New
York while legally domiciled in New York, only to be transferred for work or family purposes
to Texas.
35. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (observing that the marital age of consent varies
among the states—the minimum age is thirteen in New Hampshire versus sixteen in
Vermont). Windsor also speaks about the oft-mocked right to marry one’s cousin, available in
most states. See id.
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there should not be tiers of marriages for federal law purposes. 36 The flip side
of the Windsor coin, this author believes, is the exact same currency. Federal
benefits should be based on federal law. 37 In other words, the federal
interpretation of marriage benefits should be determined under the lex loci
celebrationis concept. That is the current state of affairs for opposite-sex
marriages, regardless of whether the marriage is legal in the place of
domicile. 38 If destination weddings are federally recognized for opposite-sex
couples that travel to Toronto, Canada, or New York City to marry, then the
same federal consideration should be given to same-sex couples who make the
exact same journey. Anything less would appear to be a violation under
Windsor’s governing principles, including the Fifth Amendment’s implicit
equal protection guarantee. 39
The application of federal law, as it applies to marital benefits and burdens,
does not interfere in any meaningful fashion with state sovereignty. 40 Legal
concepts repeatedly note that American citizens live under notions of dual
sovereignty and dual citizenship—both state and federal. The two forms of
citizenship are, in fact, legally distinct. Take, for example, income taxes and
criminal law. One can live in Oklahoma, a state mandating state income taxes,
and be liable for both federal and state income taxes. When that individual
moves to Texas, he or she cannot avoid paying federal income taxes just
because their new home state, Texas, does not recognize state income taxes.
Likewise, if an individual commits a death-eligible crime in Massachusetts, a
state without the death penalty, the federal government still reserves the right to
bring federal charges—including charges that carry the death penalty—without
infringing on the state’s sovereign right to choose its own criminal penalty
system. 41
Surely marriage is not drastically different than taxes or criminal law under
the dual sovereignty doctrine. When it comes to federally recognizing
marriage, the federal government can most assuredly have a different standard
than each individual state—just like income taxes and criminal penalties. 42 In

36. See id. at 2693–94.
37. See id. at 2693. “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their
marriages.” Id.
38. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Kasich, 1:13-CV-00501, slip op. at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 22,
2013) (“[I]t is absolutely clear that under Ohio law . . . the validity of an opposite-sex
marriage is to be determined by whether it complies with the law of the jurisdiction where it
was celebrated.”).
39. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (acknowledging that DOMA’s purpose was to
ignore more liberal state laws embracing same-sex unions, ensuring “those unions will be
treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law”) (emphasis added).
40. See id. As Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion notes, “DOMA writes inequality
into the entire United States Code,” impacting well over 1,000 federal marital benefits. Id. at
2694.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
42. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690 (“[W]hen the Federal Government acts in the
exercise of its own proper authority, it has a wide choice of the mechanisms and means to
adopt.”).
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numerous ways American citizens have separate responsibilities to their state
and federal governments. This is to be expected with dual sovereigns. But,
what the Fifth Amendment prohibits, and rightfully so, is any distinction in
receipt of federal benefits based on state residency or state law. 43 National
citizenship must confer the same federal benefits for all legally married
persons. 44 Otherwise, there will be vacillating tiers of national citizenship
based, ironically, on state residency. Such incongruity runs afoul of both logic
and law. Such incongruity should be unconstitutional. 45
Further, extending federal marital benefits to the Texas couple traveling to
New York should not be dependent on the gender of the couple or spouses.
Were there to be such fluctuation in the receipt of federal benefits, another
possible violation would occur under the constitutionally-recognized right to
travel 46—opposite-sex couples can partake in a destination wedding and still
receive federal benefits but same-sex couples cannot partake in such destination
weddings. 47 There appears no rational basis for federally drawing the line at a
state’s border. 48 If DOMA’s federal definition of marriage is unconstitutional
for legally married citizens in New York, then so too must that definition be
unconstitutional for American citizens living in Texas or Oklahoma.
To tread down a different path where the receipt of federal marital benefits
depends on one’s state residency, though possible, would result in the very
chaos and vast expenditures that Justice Kennedy sought to avoid by extending
prudential consideration to the procedural issues in Windsor. 49 And, one
should not lightly forget that Richard and Mildred Loving themselves partook
of a “destination wedding,” purposefully leaving Virginia for a more hospitable
venue in the District of Columbia. Fortunately for them, and all racial
minorities, the Supreme Court issued a much more forceful recognition of their
union when the question first came before the Court. Same-sex couples must
wait a bit longer for their full inclusion.
In the final analysis, Windsor, but not its companion case Perry, is a case
about federal power, federal benefits, and federal law. 50 Thus, the Supreme

43. See id. at 2694. “Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations
that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions,
copyright, and veterans’ benefits.” Id.
44. See id. “DOMA undermines both the public and private significance of statesanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the world, that their
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.” Id. (emphasis added).
45. See id. at 2695. The Court’s own language offers instruction for the next step in
marriage equality: “The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the
laws.” Id.
46. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969).
47. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. “DOMA instructs all federal officials . . . that
[one type of] marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.” Id. Such language
appears to be the natural predicate for equal federal treatment of all legal marriages performed
in an individual state.
48. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 637–38.
49. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687.
50. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (addressing whether
Proposition 8, a California state amendment, violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process
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Court was well within its discretion to legally determine which marriages
qualify for federal benefits under federal law. And, while Justice Scalia and
Alito properly criticize Justice Kennedy and the majority’s untethered
opinion 51—is this an equal protection case or a substantive due process
case? 52—the more pressing and enduring concern is which marriages are
federally recognized. How will the federal government resolve the destination
wedding question? Or, the relocation question? And, how long before we have
a case which provides a definitive answer to either or both questions? Justice
Scalia forecasts one year. 53 For those couples whose legal status regarding
their marriage remains in flux, even that may seem too long. We have but one
federal government. And, under that one federal government, all legal
marriages should be treated the same. Perhaps same-sex couples finally have
something to lex loci celebrationis.

and equal protection clauses which prohibit discrimination under state law).
51. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–20 (Alito, J., dissenting).
52. See id. Justice Alito fairly suggests that, “[p]erhaps because they cannot show that
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under our Constitution, Windsor and the United
States couch their arguments in equal protection terms.” Id. at 2716. But, ultimately, the
Court’s majority fails to resolve this question or clearly express on what basis the decision is
being rendered.
53. See id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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